

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Schubert and the Construction of Memory: The String Quartet in A minor, D.804 ('Rosamunde')

BENEDICT TAYLOR

> From Robert Schumann on, commentators have resorted to metaphors of memory to capture in prose the special qualities of Schubert's mature instrumental works. Recollection, retrospection, association, nostalgia: these are some of the concepts that float through Schubert criticism. […] Increasingly, we are coming to realize that the language developed for analyzing the music of Schubert's great 'other', Beethoven, is inadequate for the younger composer. The vocabulary of memory offers a plausible alternative.[1]

It is a truism of recent musicology that Schubert was the master of musical memory. Books and articles have explored the role of memory and nostalgia in Schubert's songs as well as in his instrumental music, and the core section of an entire issue of a leading musicological journal has even been dedicated to this theme (see note 1). Memory and nostalgia are favoured topics in modern academic study, but there is no doubting that their focus in music is concentrated in the direction of that written by a small, bespectacled Viennese man who died young enough to have been given little chance to become unduly nostalgic for his own past.

As the quotation from Walter Frisch above also demonstrates, this characteristic temporal quality of Schubert's music is furthermore habitually contrasted with that of Beethoven's – a comparison which forms another long-standing topos of Schubert reception. Adapting Carl Dahlhaus's formulations, it could be said that one composer looked forwards, the other backwards.[2] For one (according to Theodor

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I would like to thank the undergraduates of Magdalen College, Oxford, for sharing my bafflement confronted with the topic of Schubert and memory, Scott Burnham for his helpful suggestions, and Kofi Agawu and Susan Wollenberg for their kind advice. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

[1] Walter Frisch, Introduction to 'Memory and Schubert's Instrumental Music', *Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 581–663 (p. 581).

[2] Carl Dahlhaus, 'Sonata Form in Schubert', *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies*, ed. Walter Frisch (Lincoln, NE, 1986), 1–12 (p. 8).

Adorno), a 15-minute movement appeared to exist as a moment; for the other, a beautiful moment became an eternity. Thus invariably, it would seem, all accounts of Schubert's instrumental music commence with the binary opposition formed with the figure of Beethoven. Moreover, pleading for Schubert to be measured 'on his own terms', which differ from Beethoven-orientated norms, is almost as old as the comparison itself.[3]

Yet despite the well-entrenched validity of this comparison, it must be noted that Beethoven's own music is already liable to collapse the all-too-ready distinctions between an 'intensive' teleological temporal experience and an 'extensive' nostalgic or even purportedly timeless state, quite unaided by his younger colleague.[4] It is not so much the case that the time sense suggested by Schubert's music differs from that suggested by Beethoven's *simpliciter* as that both of these composers, living alongside each other in 1820s Vienna, have been heard to depart from the temporal qualities formed by Beethoven's 'heroic' style some 20 years earlier. Late Beethoven is closer in musical as well as historical time to Schubert than to his all-conquering heroic self.

Nevertheless, there still persists a sense in which, even allowing for the considerable exaggeration and crude dualisms created by music historiography, Schubert's music is quite distinct from Beethoven's, whether that from his middle or his late period. Playing down the distinction runs the risk of fitting one composer into the Procrustean bed of his fellow traveller. Qualities of memory, reminiscence, fatalism, wandering, circularity or non-teleological lyricism, dwelling on the sensuous present, seem to constitute some of the most characteristic and endearing attributes that make Schubert sound like Schubert. This article examines how such nostalgic subjectivities are constructed in Schubert's music and the language used to describe

[3] For example, Hermann Keller writes: 'So müssen wir an die in Sonatenform geschriebenen Sonaten Schuberts mit einer ganz anderen Einstellung herantreten als an die Beethovens. Das hat […] Armin Knab schon 1920 efordert: "Man möge doch endlich aufhören, in Schuberts Sonaten nur verhinderte Beethoven-Sonaten zu sehen"' ('Schuberts Verhältnis zur Sonatenform', *Musa – Mens – Musici: Im Gedenken an Walther Vetter* (Leipzig, 1969), 287–95 (p. 293)). Almost two decades later, Dahlhaus repeats the claim that 'Schubert's lyric-epic sonata form ought not to be measured by the standards of Beethoven's dramatic-dialectic form' ('Sonata Form in Schubert', 1), while Peter Gülke speaks of the reclassification ('Umqualifizierung') of (Beethovenian) sonata logic necessary for understanding Schubert ('Zum Bilde des späten Schubert', *Musik-Konzepte Franz Schubert*, ed. Heinz-Klaus Metzger and Rainer Riehn (Munich, 1979), 107–66 (p. 158)).

[4] See, for instance, Carl Dahlhaus, *Ludwig van Beethoven: Approaches to his Music*, trans. Mary Whittall (Oxford, 1991), 202–3; Theodor W. Adorno, *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, ed. Rolf Tiedermann, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge, 1998), 88–92; Eckehard Kiem, 'Der Blick in Abgrund: Zeitstruktur beim späten Beethoven', *Musik in der Zeit: Zeit in der Musik*, ed. Richard Klein, Eckehard Kiem and Wolfram Ette (Göttingen, 2000), 216–18; Elaine Sisman, 'Memory and Invention at the Threshold of Beethoven's Late Style', *Beethoven and his World*, ed. Scott Burnham and Michael Steinberg (Princeton, NJ, 2000), 51–87; and Karol Berger, 'Between Utopia and Melancholy: Beethoven and the Aesthetic State', *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow: An Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2007), 293–350.

it. It does not ultimately seek to overturn the now habitual associations between Schubert and memory, but rather to question a little more deeply how they are – or might better be – supported, how music may suggest the actions of memory and temporal consciousness. It looks principally at the String Quartet in A minor, D.804 ('Rosamunde'), a work hitherto accorded little discussion with regard to Schubert and memory, but also draws on such staples of the Schubertian memory discourse as the Quartet in G, D.887, and the Piano Sonata in B♭, D.960.

Memorabilia: theoretical preliminaries

In considering the question of music and memory, two fundamental factors are worth bearing in mind from the start, ideas which will reappear in different forms throughout the ensuing discussion. First, it would generally be agreed by most philosophers that memory requires both a subject and an object – that doing the remembering and that which is remembered.[5] Secondly, as Aristotle, the earliest systematic examiner of the topic, states, 'memory relates to what is past'.[6] Memory involves time, specifically the relation between past and present.

How memory works – if there are not indeed multiple types and mechanisms – is still being explored and disputed, albeit nowadays more within the discipline of psychology than philosophy. How the interaction of the two factors set out above might be manifested in music is likewise open to many different permutations and interpretations. Most obviously, a human listener (the subject) may hear or recall in his or her head music (the object) he or she has heard before at some earlier point in time, and recognize that he or she has already heard it. This is simply memory – it is only musical in terms of the nature of the object. Memory is obviously involved in the perception of all music, indeed in all modes of understanding.[7] Towards the other end of the memory spectrum, more interesting – and more problematic, too – is the common formulation of music (as subject, having been somehow attributed agency) remembering its own earlier themes (the object of its memory). Many variations are possible between these two extremes.

Thus the remembering subject may range from the straightforward example of the present-day listener, to the composer (the biographical subject), his or her contemporary audience, the 'composer' construed as aesthetic subject (the lyric 'I' – or in

[5] See Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago, IL, 2006), 3–4.

[6] Aristotle, *On Memory*, 449b14, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ, 1984), i, 714.

[7] Clearly there is a host of technical ways (involving the role of generic expectation, the 'non-sounding' elements of music (e.g. form), motor mechanisms of performance, etc.) in which memory is practically involved in musical perception and performance which are extraneous to the more hermeneutic sense of musical memory investigated here.

collective terms, if speaking on behalf of his or her fellow people, 'we'), or even the music 'itself'. In some cases it is indeed unclear who or what is claimed to be remembering.[8] The object of memory is more consistently 'music', though even here one might speak figuratively of experiences being remembered rather than simply themes. Similarly, concerning the question of pastness, different possible types of 'memory' in music may also be briefly summarized. Music may quote or allude to past music – to a general earlier historical style, to a specific earlier historical composition, to an earlier work by the same composer, or to the specific piece's own musical 'past', either at the multi-movement level (what is commonly known as cyclic form) or within a movement (which raises the question of what, if anything, differentiates memory from mere formal repetition). Furthermore, one might ask if there are semantic associations bound up with any of the categories above. Might the allusion involve a textual reference to something that creates a further, verbal web of memory, or are we projecting a composer's supposed state of mind, his or her biography, onto the music's aesthetic subject? More awkward (but also more intriguing) is the question of how music, without alluding to anything which can be shown to have been heard prior to it, may already sound like a memory.

This theme of memory easily spills over into the related idea of nostalgia. In its original, etymological meaning (as 'longing for home', whether literally or more figuratively), the concept of nostalgia implies spatial distance more immediately than any temporal loss, but obviously relies on memory and thus may easily blur with the longing not so much for a lost place as for a lost time – the sense in which it is commonly used today. Thus nostalgia in music invokes pastness, specifically loss. It dwells on the absence or distance; it is memory with an emphasis on memory's affective modality, the emotive aspect of longing. Nostalgia has long been associated with Schubert. As Christopher Gibbs notes:

> The theme of nostalgia also has its origins in the composer's own time, which is somewhat surprising given that it would seem to require temporal mediation […]. The air of nostalgia comes not only from verbal accounts [e.g. later reminiscences of his friends] but maybe even more strongly from visual images [e.g. posthumous paintings of the Schubert circle], from Schubert's own wistful music, and especially from later arrangements of it.[9]

This idea of nostalgia, alongside the simpler variants of musical memory involving allusion to earlier styles and works, is perhaps the most straightforward starting point for exploring the connection of memory and nostalgia with Schubert's music.

[8] Cf. the brief account in Walter Frisch, '"You Must Remember This": Memory and Structure in Schubert's String Quartet in G major, D.887', *Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 582–603.

[9] Christopher Gibbs, '"Poor Schubert": Images and Legends of the Composer', *The Cambridge Companion to Schubert*, ed. Gibbs (Cambridge, 1997), 36–55 (p. 52).

References to earlier music and the broader construction of nostalgia

One of the most perfect and moving crystallizations of the sense of pastness, loss and nostalgia within Schubert's oeuvre is the String Quartet in A minor, D.804 – in Sir George Grove's words, a 'beautiful and intensely personal' work 'which has been not wrongly said to be the most characteristic work of any composer'.[10] Composed in February 1824, the 'Rosamunde' was first performed soon after, on 14 March, by the Schuppanzigh Quartet; it was the only one of Schubert's quartets to be published in his lifetime. Schubert biographer John Reed has aptly described the quartet as 'in emotional terms, a Romantic excursion to the land of lost content', a work '"about" disenchantment, and the loss of innocence'.[11]

A letter the composer wrote to Leopold Kupelwieser on 31 March 1824 is particularly revealing concerning the state of Schubert's mind during the time of the quartet's conception:

> Think of a man whose health will never be right again, and who from despair over this always makes things worse instead of better, think of a man, I say, whose brightest hopes have come to nothing, for whom the happiness of love and friendship offer nothing but at best pain, whose ardour (at least stimulating) for beauty threatens to forsake him, and I ask you, if he is not a miserable, unhappy man? – '*My peace is gone, my heart is heavy, I shall find it never, never more*', so I may well sing this every day now, for every night, when I go to sleep, I hope to wake no more, and every morning only heralds yesterday's grief.[12]

Biographically, this dejection and hopelessness may be explained in several ways. Generally assumed to be most important were the consequences of the presumed venereal infection with which Schubert had been diagnosed little over a year earlier and which was incurable in his day.[13] The early months of 1824 were spent following a spartan dietary regime that seems to have alleviated the symptoms somewhat, even if it did nothing for Schubert's state of mind, and in his letter Schubert goes on to suggest that he found his only solace in the composition of this quartet and the following one in D minor ('Death and the Maiden', written that March, close on the heels of the A minor). Furthermore, the turn to chamber music initiated by this quartet was made in the wake of the failure of Schubert's concerted

[10] Sir George Grove, *Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn*, ed. Eric Blom (London, 1951), 232.

[11] John Reed, *Schubert*, Master Musicians (Oxford, 1997), 105, 130.

[12] Schubert, letter to Leopold Kupelwieser, 31 March 1824, in *Schubert: Die Dokumente seines Lebens*, ed. Otto Erich Deutsch (Kassel, 1964), 234, translation modified from Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography*, trans. Eric Blom (London, 1947), 339.

[13] Elizabeth Norman McKay (*Franz Schubert: A Biography* (Oxford, 1996), 164) dates the onset of syphilis as being probably in November 1822 – the time Schubert was writing the 'Unfinished' Symphony. It is indeed hard for listeners not to hypothesize a connection between life and art by hearing something of this sense of dread in the B minor Symphony, the contemporaneous 'Wanderer' Fantasy or the Piano Sonata in A minor, D.784, written the following February.

attempts at conquering the operatic and theatrical stage in the two preceding years, most recently with *Rosamunde*.

Maurice Brown describes Schubert's mood at this time as being one of 'aching regret for the vanished days of his youth'.[14] In his A minor Quartet a substantial part of this sense of loss and longing for vanished innocence is embodied through the use of allusions to earlier pieces – in the sense of their status as musical memories of these previous works, in the sometimes fragmentary quality of their appearance in the quartet, and last but not least in their potential semantic associations. Nicholas Rast has emphasized in this context that this 'prominent use of quotations from earlier works signif[ies] a new departure' for Schubert in his successful re-engagement with chamber music that started with D.804.[15] The most overtly significant of these allusions for the current discussion, though not the most materially substantial, is the well-known citation in the third-movement Menuetto of the haunting opening figure from Schubert's earlier 'Strophe aus Schillers *Die Götter Griechenlands*', D.677, written in November 1819 (see Examples 1a and b). Schiller's poem describes the disenchantment of the world and its present alienation from the supposed spiritual unity and wholeness of ancient Greece, a quintessential theme of German philhellenism. (Such nostalgia for what many German-speaking intellectuals perceived as Europe's spiritual homeland had been given a more recent twist by the declaration of Greek independence on 1 January 1822, precisely midway between Schubert's setting of Schiller's poem and his composition of the A minor Quartet. But, as suggested above, nostalgia is in practice more about longing for a lost time than a lost place.) Strophe 12, the one set by Schubert, runs as follows:

Schöne Welt, wo bist du? Kehre wieder,
Holdes Blütenalter der Natur!
Ach, nur in dem Feenland der Lieder
Lebt noch deine fabelhafte Spur.
Ausgestorben trauert das Gefilde,
Keine Gottheit zeigt sich meinem Blick,
Ach, von jenem lebenwarmen Bilde
Blieb der Schatten nur zurück.

(Beauteous world, where art thou? Return again,
Sweet springtime of nature!
Alas, only in the magic land of song
Lives on your fabulous trace.
Deserted the plains mourn,

[14] Maurice J. E. Brown, *Schubert: A Critical Biography* (London, 1958), 179.

[15] Nicholas Rast, '"Schöne Welt wo bist du?": Motive and Form in Schubert's A minor String Quartet', *Schubert the Progressive: History, Performance Practice, Analysis*, ed. Brian Newbould (Aldershot, 2003), 81–8 (p. 81).

No god reveals himself to my view,
Ah, from that living picture
Remains behind only the shadow.)

Graham Johnson has perceptively commented on the original song's curious, even deliberate, incompleteness: 'It as if we are ruefully contemplating fragments of a broken Greek vase; we feel certain that we will find the missing piece to render it whole once more, but this, like the belief that we can travel backwards in time, is cruel illusion.'[16] In fact, the song's fragmentary quality was even more pointed in its first version, in which the questioning figure over a dominant pedal in the piano's introduction and postlude – the music cited directly in the quartet – is left open

Example 1a. Schubert, 'Strophe aus Schillers *Die Götter Griechenlands*', D.677 (first version), bars 1–8.



[16] Graham Johnson, notes to Hyperion Schubert Edition, vol. 14, CDJ33014 (1992), 9.

Example 1b. Schubert, String Quartet in A minor ('Rosamunde'), D.804, third movement, bars 1–11.



without the bass ever resolving to the tonic. Some time later, Schubert amended his manuscript in lead pencil to the present, belated resolution to a root-position A minor. Richard Kramer, for one, laments the revision: with the original 'irresolute, fundamentally dissonant' 6/4, Schiller's question was 'made to echo into eternity'.[17] In turn, Rast suggests that 'Schubert's recollection of this apparently fragmentary song […] quotes only fragments' – that is, fragments of a fragment. And as Grove describes Schubert's original song, it is a 'beautiful fragment' (one strophe) from Schiller's longer (16-strophe) poem.[18]

[17] Richard Kramer, *Distant Cycles: Schubert and the Conceiving of Song* (Chicago, IL, 1994), 53.
[18] Rast, '"Schöne Welt wo bist du?"', 86; Grove, *Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn*, ed. Blom, 246.

For many commentators, this poem serves as the underlying theme of the quartet, both in expressive content and (more questionably) in musical material. Susan Wollenberg, for instance, notes how the incipit from *Die Götter Griechenlands* is inverted at the beginning of the trio and later echoed in the opening of the finale.[19] James Sobaskie also contends that *Die Götter Griechenlands* influences more than the third movement: the opening melodic motive of the quartet – the descending triad *e″–c″–a′* in bars 3–4 (see Example 2a) – may be said to be taken from the setting of '[wo] bist du?', though elsewhere the plausibility of the conjectured links is perhaps more strained.[20] More generally and probably persuasively, the major–minor interplay across the quartet, pronounced even for Schubert, seems to take its cue from the framing of the song's A major 'Kehre wieder […]' by the A minor opening question, especially within the first movement. Thus, for Alfred Einstein, the distinction between the Romantic lament for a lost world and the only remaining trace that survives in the 'fairyland of song' expressed in Schiller's text is symbolized in the contrast between A minor and A major which is taken up in the first movement of the quartet as 'the basic principle governing its form and content. Thus in the instrumental work [Schubert] gave expression to something he could only hint at in the song. It is not a "programme" […] but a symbol.'[21]

The potential allusions to earlier songs do not stop here, however. Jack Westrup, picking up the suggestive allusion to *Gretchen am Spinnrade* in Schubert's letter to Kupelwieser, claims that 'something of the mood of [that] song has filtered into the first movement of the A minor quartet, particularly in the restless accompaniment which starts two bars before a melody is heard'.[22] Although this is hardly a direct quotation, there is nonetheless something unmistakably similar in the second violin's mesmeric, sinuous quavers weaving around scale degree $\hat{3}$, underpinned by the fatalistic repeated figure in cello and viola (the accompaniment to the first subject proper of the 'Unfinished' Symphony is similarly called to mind; see Examples 2a and b). The twisting line in the second violin might be thought of as rematerializing in the constant quaver murmuring present within the ensuing two movements.

The most famous reuse of material in the quartet, though, is found in the second movement, which gives rise to the subtitle affixed to Schubert's work. The second movement might seem a memory to the listener, either from the B♭ Entr'acte (Andantino) from *Rosamunde*, D.797, or, in distorted form, the Impromptu in B♭, op. 142/D.935 no. 3 (1827). The latter was composed several years after the quartet,

[19] Susan Wollenberg, *Schubert's Fingerprints: Studies in the Instrumental Works* (Aldershot, 2011), 201–2, note 11.

[20] James William Sobaskie, 'Tonal Implication and the Gestural Dialectic in Schubert's A minor Quartet', *Schubert the Progressive*, ed. Newbould, 53–79.

[21] Alfred Einstein, *Schubert: The Man and his Music*, trans. David Ascoli (London, 1951), 192. Also cf. Wollenberg, *Schubert's Fingerprints*, 24.

[22] Jack A. Westrup, *Schubert Chamber Music*, BBC Music Guides (London, 1969), 31.

Example 2a. Schubert, String Quartet in A minor ('Rosamunde'), D.804, first movement, bars 1–9.



Example 2b. Schubert, *Gretchen am Spinnrade*, D.118, bars 1–6.



so its status as a memory is possible only for a latter-day listener not overly concerned with compositional chronology, but the *Rosamunde* borrowing might constitute an inter-opus memory or even a projected (biographical) memory by Schubert. As is well known, although Schubert's music itself received some praise, the staging of *Rosamunde* was a failure, the performance was a flop and the opera was withdrawn after only two performances.[23] This marked Schubert's last effort for some time to attain success on the stage, after two years of fruitless struggles with operatic and theatrical projects. For the composer, disillusioned by the fate of *Rosamunde*, the memory of this piece must have held connotations of disappointment. It would thus be reasonable to say, with Reed, that disillusion became the theme of the quartet he subsequently wrote.

Despite the existence of extensive critical attention devoted to characterizing the quartet in terms of Schiller's poem, the work is commonly known as the 'Rosamunde', not the (admittedly more unwieldy) 'Gods of Greece' Quartet. Yet I would like to suggest that the two titles are not as disparate as they might at first

[23] For further details concerning *Rosamunde*'s sorry fate, see Elizabeth Norman McKay, *Franz Schubert's Music for the Theatre* (Tutzing, 1991), 271–4, 281–2.

appear. This connection may be drawn out further through a hermeneutic reading stemming from both the plot of *Rosamunde* and the context of Schubert's encounter with it.

Helmina von Chézy's play *Rosamunde, Fürstin von Cypern* (*Rosamunde, Princess of Cypress*) was performed in Vienna on 20 and 21 December 1823 with incidental music provided by Schubert. The original text for the 1823 Vienna (and subsequent 1824 Munich) production is apparently lost, but there exists a fragmentary draft sketch for the first five scenes dating from the autumn of 1823 and a revised version from some time later (the exact date is unknown), both of which have recently come to light. They exhibit some variance in the names of minor figures and from the words used by Schubert in the extant musical numbers; the revised version is, furthermore, in five acts, in contrast to the four-act version advertised on the Viennese programme.[24] In effect, we are offered a tantalizing glimpse of *Rosamunde* before and after Schubert's encounter with it, and are left to draw our own conclusions as to their connections with the lost version.

The first, draft conception starts with Rosamunde, on the eve of her seventeenth birthday, sitting at the spinning wheel in her adoptive mother Axa's hut by the sea, reflecting on the flight of time and the passing of her youth:

> Die Flamme leuchtet mir so traulich zu,
> Und sinnend, spinnend fliegen hin die Stunden,
> Der kurzen Sommernacht, so bist auch Du,
> Glückselge Kindheit, wie ein Traum entschwunden![25]
>
> (The flame shines on me so familiarly,
> And musing, spinning the hours fly,
> The short summer night, just as you,
> Blessed childhood, vanished like a dream!)

The scenic similarity of Chézy's Rosamunde at the spinning wheel with Goethe's Gretchen, alluded to by Schubert in his letter of March 1824, is striking. Although the dramatic outline is similar in the second, revised version, the words of Rosamunde's opening soliloquy have been changed. In fact, they seem even more familiar:

> Herz, im Busen mir so schwer,
> Wird dir keine Ruhe mehr?

[24] *Rosamunde: Drama in fünf Akten von Helmina von Chézy, Musik von Franz Schubert: Erstveröffentlichung der überarbeiteten Fassung, mit einem Nachwort und unbekannten Quellen*, ed. Till Gerrit Waidelich (Tutzing, 1996), and Till Gerrit Waidelich, 'Ein fragmentarischer autographer Entwurf zur Erstfassung von Chézys Schauspiel "Rosamunde"', *Schubert durch die Brille*, Internationales Franz Schubert Institut, Mitteilungen, 18 (Tutzing, 1997), 46–57.

[25] Chézy, *Rosamunde* (draft version), Act 1, scene i, lines 1–4; Waidelich, 'Ein fragmentarischer autographer Entwurf', 47.

In mir war's anders, jüngst noch, wie so wonnig
Erglühte mir des jungen Tages Licht,
Die Blum' in Thau, auf Wiesen grün und sonnig
Strahlt' freudiger als meine Seele nicht.
Wo bist du hin, des Lebens süße Fülle?
Wo bist du hin, des Herzens traute Stille?[26]

(Heart, so heavy upon my breast,
Will you be no more at peace?
In me it was so different, until of late, blissfully
Glowed in me the young day's light,
The dewy flower, on meadows green and sunny
Beamed not more joyously than my soul.
Where have you gone, sweet fullness of life?
Where have you gone, heart's trusted rest?)

Compare Chézy's lines first with the opening lines of *Gretchen am Spinnrade* – 'Meine Ruh' ist hin, / Mein Herz ist schwer / Ich finde sie nimmer / Und nimmermehr' – and secondly with the line from Schiller's *Die Götter Griechenlands* which Schubert set at the opening of D.677 ('Schöne Welt, wo bist du?'). Then, to complete the analogy, consider the emotional content of the intervening lines 5–8 ('In mir war's anders'), which seem to match the lost happiness of the *Rosamunde* borrowing in the second movement of D.804. Indeed, in Act 4, for the words that probably followed the B♭ Entr'acte, Rosamunde is found in a charming valley in the mountains, echoing very similar sentiments:

Wie süß und hell der Morgen – wie dieß Thal
Hat seinem Frieden traulich mich umfängt,
Hier ist noch Alles, wie es jemals war,
In mir nur ist es anders – Sel'ge Ruh,
Werd' ich Dich wiederfinden?[27]

(How sweet and light the morning – how this vale
Has enfolded me familiarly in its peace,
Here is everything as it yet was,
Only in me is it different – blessed rest,
Shall I find you once more?)

[26] Chézy, *Rosamunde* (revised version), Act 1, scene i, lines 3–10; *Rosamunde: Drama in fünf Akten von Helmina von Chézy*, ed. Waidelich, 83.

[27] *Ibid.*, 134–5. This scene forms Act 4, scene iv, in the revised five-act version, though contemporary accounts suggest it opened the four-act version that Schubert wrote for. The plot of this act certainly shows some variance from reports of the première (for instance, Rosamunde does not pretend to be mad for the benefit of the tyrannical Flugentius/Fluvio in Chézy's revision). See *Franz Schubert: Dokumente 1817–1830*, i: *Texte: Programme, Rezensionen, Anzeigen, Nekrologe, Musikbeilagen und andere gedruckte Quellen*, ed. Till Gerrit Waidelich (Tutzing, 1993), 173–80.

Certainly these lines seem to encapsulate perfectly the mood of the second movement within the context of the quartet.

Thus, Schubert's reuse of the B♭ Entr'acte from *Rosamunde* in the A minor Quartet is not merely a memory from Schubert's own recent past but further carries with it associations of a lost past happiness within the context of its use in the play – a play which appears to echo the texts associated with the musical memories found in the quartet's two surrounding movements. Perhaps D.804 should be named the 'Rosamunde' Quartet after all. Although brought up a humble shepherdess, Schubert's Cyprian princess holds her own with the Grecian gods.

A different type of nostalgia is created in the quartet by allusion to past musical styles, most evidently in the third movement. By 1824 a minuet was certainly a little old-fashioned, and such is the pervasive air of regret with which Schubert invests the music that it readily evokes a sense of temporal distance and loss. 'Is this really a minuet, or merely a reminiscence of the genre?' asks Sobaskie; 'a nostalgic reflection, or perhaps an ironic commentary on a genre whose time has long passed?'[28] Peculiarly distinctive is the manner in which the initial questioning figure from Schubert's setting of Schiller is repeated not once but three times, as if the music is dwelling on the verge of remembering. The written-out pause over the fifth bar of the movement is liminal in function, the ineffable boundary between the present and the memory of the minuet that is summoned up.

If there seems something gently, almost wistfully archaic in the very use of a minuet, the musette-like drone of the trio is unmistakably Arcadian in its pastoral tone, a glimpse of a now-departed world surely too beautiful, too happy, to be true. Schubert's trio forms an idyll in the midst of a Schillerian elegy, the genres famously theorized by Schiller with respect to this same universal homesickness in his essay *Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung*. In a letter written some months later, Schubert likewise laments Schiller's overriding theme of the mundanity of the present compared with the greatness of the past. In Reed's paraphrase:

> The idle time, which hinders the fulfilment of all greatness, destroys me too. Even golden verse is foolishly mocked by the people, no longer attentive to its powerful message. Only by the gift of sacred art can we still image forth the strength and achievements of former times.[29]

Such sentiments echo distinctly the message of *Die Götter Griechenlands*. Only in art – more specifically, the enchanted realm of song – can one perceive the trace of this

[28] Sobaskie, 'Tonal Implication and the Gestural Dialectic', 55.

[29] Reed, *Schubert*, 105, a compression of Schubert's letter to Franz von Schober, 21 September 1824, in *Schubert: Die Dokumente seines Lebens*, ed. Deutsch, 258–9; Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography*, trans. Blom, 375.

lost world of spiritual perfection. Or as Schiller expresses it in the final strophe of his poem:

> Ja, sie kehrten heim, und alles Schöne,
> Alles Hohe nahmen sie mit fort,
> Alle Farben, alle Lebenstöne,
> Und uns blieb nur das entseelte Wort.
> Aus der Zeitflut weggerissen, schweben
> Sie gerettet auf des Pindus Höhn,
> Was unsterblich im Gesang soll leben,
> Muß im Leben untergehn.[30]
>
> (Yes, they returned home, and took
> All that is beautiful, highest with them,
> All colours, all tones of life,
> And with us remains only the desouled word.
>
> Torn from the flight of time, floating
> They escaped to the heights of Pindus,
> What should live on undying in song,
> Must disappear from life.)

The claim that this lost world of content and unity may survive only in song obviously has great resonance for the undisputed master of the German lied and arch-lyricist among composers. In an insightful article on Schubert's lyrical sonata forms and their distinctive form of musical temporality, Su Yin Mak proposes, with reference to just this poem of Schiller, that 'in Schubert the cantabile style, with its long association with lyricism in music, often functions as a musical topic […] to represent the ideal of song'.[31] Although concentrating on other chamber works, most notably the Piano Trio in E♭, D.929, Mak's argument clearly makes a valuable point in relation to D.804. The role of song in the quartet, its pervasive lyricism, may hold a deeper hermeneutic meaning vis-à-vis Schiller's claim for this art. The lyricism of the A minor Quartet is pronounced even for Schubert. Westrup has commented on how the two-bar introduction for the opening movement's first subject is unusual: despite his habitual lyricism, Schubert normally refrains from starting an instrumental movement with anything sounding like a song. The second subject, moreover, starts with minimal transition, just as if it were another, different song.[32] In other words, this is perhaps the most consistently songlike sonata form Schubert ever wrote. Admittedly, the second movement, taken from *Rosamunde*, is

[30] Friedrich Schiller, 'Die Götter Griechenlands', *Sämtliche Werke*, 5 vols. (Munich, 1962), i, 168–72 (p. 172).

[31] Su Yin Mak, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and the Poetics of the Lyric', *Journal of Musicology*, 23 (2006), 263–306 (p. 294).

[32] Westrup, *Schubert Chamber Music*, 32–3.

not actually a song, but its gentle lyricism is unmistakable, and while the last two movements are essentially dancelike, a lyrical quality is rarely absent.[33]

And what of the finale? 'Can a work with three such movements end on a gay or triumphant note in the fourth?' Einstein asks. 'It admittedly ends in the major […] but – as a number of mysterious phrases suggest – without any real consolation, in spite of the two loud final chords.'[34] These chords themselves undermine the strength of the work's ultimate cadential closure: the weak $\hat{2}$–$\hat{1}$ cadential motion in the cello's bass line (not to mention the preceding tonic acciaccaturas) belies the very stability their *fortissimo* dynamic endeavours to convey. (This idea would later be taken up in even more intensified form at the close of the C major Quintet, D.956, in the dark Neapolitan twist that spreads an uncanny shadow over the conclusion of that work.)

Earlier in the finale, a passage in C♯ minor that functions as the movement's second subject might be thought of as forming a distant memory or echo of this tonal area, which had been heard for a significant passage in the minuet's second half. This C♯ tonality has been interpreted by Charles Fisk as having a peculiar, fate-laden significance for Schubert in other pieces: it is the 'Wanderer' key of the eponymous 1816 song, and crops up again in the 'Wanderer' Fantasy and for significant moments of the last piano sonatas.[35] Besides the uncanny effect of the new, insistent dotted rhythms, the unreality of this passage is underscored by the *pianissimo* marking and its apparent formal subversion. In the context of an A major movement the second theme 'should' be in the dominant, E major. It keeps on slipping there at the end of phrases, but reverts just as insistently to its relative minor (see Example 3). This lower ghostly presence undermines the secondary tonality, and since there is no distinct third theme in the dominant, thematically one may not speak of a normal Schubertian three-key exposition.[36] Not for nothing does Adorno label this theme in the finale a 'phantom', as 'the secret that […] runs like fine criss-crossings through Schubert's entire oeuvre, tangibly approaching and then disappearing'. It has the flavour of a native dialect or homeland, yet there is no

[33] It is thus quite ironic that the clearest allusions to earlier works in the quartet are not to vocal parts but are in fact either to instrumental figures from songs (*Gretchen* in the first movement, *Die Götter Griechenlands* in the third) or an instrumental entr'acte (second movement); the only possible vocal allusion is to the '[wo] bist du?' of D.677 in the first movement, and this is already quite distant.

[34] Einstein, *Schubert*, 285.

[35] Charles Fisk, *Returning Cycles: Contexts for the Interpretation of Schubert's Impromptus and Last Sonatas* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2001), 80.

[36] Although in this case the key of C♯ functions as a straightforward diatonic submediant, one is reminded of Taruskin's apt formulation that 'the flat submediant often functions in "late Schubert" as a constant shadow to the tonic, so that the music seems perpetually to hover on that "edge" of inwardness'. Richard Taruskin, *The Oxford History of Western Music*, 6 vols. (Oxford, 2005), iii: *The Nineteenth Century*, 96.

Example 3. Schubert, String Quartet in A minor ('Rosamunde'), D.804, finale, bars 62–78.



such place – it is only a memory. For Adorno, 'He is never further away from that place than when he cites it.'[37]

This movement seems rather an ironic or 'failed' attempt at detachment into a more everyday world, whose illusion is regretfully signalled throughout. Thus we might conceive an overall temporal trajectory for the quartet, moving from the present reality and dread of the first movement ('My peace is gone'), to a memory of that lost, idyllic world in the second movement ('Here is everything as it yet was'), to the subsequent stage of the loss of that dream and painful longing for that world in the Menuetto ('Beauteous world, where art thou?'), which is still shot through with idealized glimpses in the pastoral-like trio, followed by the last stage in the finale – a present in which we attempt to forget this pain and move back into the world, albeit a disenchanted one. The finale, the least nostalgic movement, where memories (despite the C♯ minor apparition that flits in and out) are forgone, is hence the only one not to allude to earlier compositions.

John Gingerich has sympathetically commented on the 'Biedermeier' aesthetic (understood non-pejoratively) of Schubert's music in relation to the heroic paradigm of middle-period Beethoven:

> For romanticism's stepchildren of Schubert's generation, the operative paradigm could no longer be heroism but had perforce become loss, and self-consciousness could no longer confidently inhabit telos but must perforce come to terms with the memories of loss. This new kind of retrospective introspection engenders a loss of epistemological innocence, of the naively unified self.[38]

As Schubert was to write in a letter to his brother, Ferdinand, a few months after completing D.804:

> Certainly it is no longer that happy time during which each object seems to us to be surrounded with a shining youthful aura, but rather one of fateful recognition of miserable reality, which I endeavour to beautify as much as possible by my imagination (thank God). We fancy that happiness lies in places where once we were happier, whereas it is actually only in ourselves.[39]

The world Schubert takes us to by the end of his A minor Quartet is a resigned one, but it is one that is also more mature.

[37] Theodor W. Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', trans. Jonathan Dunsby and Beate Perrey, *19th-Century Music*, 29 (2005–6), 3–14 (p. 14).

[38] John M. Gingerich, 'Remembrance and Consciousness in Schubert's C-major String Quintet, D.956', *Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 619–34 (p. 629).

[39] Schubert, letter to Ferdinand Schubert, 16–18 July 1824, in Deutsch, *Schubert: Die Dokumente seines Lebens*, ed. Deutsch, 250; Deutsch, *Schubert: A Documentary Biography*, trans. Blom, 363 (translation slightly modified).

The pastness of music's object of memory

The A minor Quartet evokes nostalgia and memory on multiple levels, some audible, others more intellectually, abstractly constructed. It may be used to demonstrate how we can assemble a reading of nostalgia from a web of biographical, allusive and musical details, freely mixing and combining the composer's own sense of loss, a trope taken from Schiller and the wider range of early nineteenth-century German culture with which Schubert aligned himself, his use of allusions to other pieces and styles, and not least our own disposition to nostalgia.

The question still remains, however, as to how music might itself possess the quality of memory. How might we justify the common association between Schubert's music and memory, or at least make this connection analytically more plausible? The difficulties are not insubstantial. Beyond the fact that, as noted earlier, the ways in which the subject and object of memory may be used in conjunction with music are multifold, ranging from the literal to the purely metaphorical, a verbal account basing itself on study of the musical score risks missing a vital part of the sensuous immediacy of Schubert's music that contributes so vitally to the sense of memory. Dahlhaus rightly notes that 'Schubert is a composer whose musical imagination is to an exceptional degree tied to the sensuous phenomenon'.[40] Without analytical grounding, however, the discussion risks becoming amorphous and even contrived. A middle way, moving between phenomenological and analytical accounts of the music, seems the most promising approach to adopt.

Aristotle, we recall, states that 'memory relates to what is past'. He continues: 'All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed.'[41] We might start with concentrating on the pastness of the musical object of memory. As John Daverio has noted, Schumann's influential early account of the Impromptus D.935 hit upon 'one of the most uncanny aspects of Schubert's music: its richness in musical ideas that, even on their first appearance, are imbued with the quality of a reminiscence'.[42] But how can music in itself sound past?

One potential method of temporal marking, albeit quite limited, relates to topic theory or what Kofi Agawu would call 'extroversive' musical signification. A specific musical topic such as the horn call is culturally construed as signifying distance, absence and thus, by association, memory.[43] It is arguable whether such music is heard unmediatedly as 'past', however, or is not rather understood as denoting the past symbolically. Similarly, though almost at the other extreme, a sense of nostalgia

[40] Dahlhaus, 'Sonata Form in Schubert', 7.

[41] Aristotle, *On Memory*, 449b14, 28, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Barnes, i, 714.

[42] John Daverio, '"One More Beautiful Memory of Schubert": Schumann's Critique of the Impromptus, D.935', *Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 604–18 (p. 610).

[43] Two classic instances in instrumental music and song respectively are Beethoven's Piano Sonata in E♭, op. 81a ('Les adieux' or 'Lebewohl'), and Schubert's 'Der Lindenbaum' from *Winterreise*. This topic is masterfully explored by Charles Rosen in *The Romantic Generation* (London, 1996), 116–24.

might be created simply from an overriding mood of beauty and contentment. In the Piano Sonata in G, D.894, the limpid simplicity and purity of the opening creates a sense of wholeness and beauty, a state of grace and innocence, which somehow is too good, too pure, to be true. Like a childhood illusion or a fairy tale, the Arcadian tone of the music is marked as distanced, past or dreamlike – in other words, not real. Just as with the trio or second movement of the 'Rosamunde' Quartet, nostalgia seems here as appropriate a term as memory.[44] Both these forms of signifying a quality of pastness are of some, though limited, use.

A different approach would be comparison with another communicative medium. In language, one of the most obvious ways of signalling the prior happening of events is the use of grammatical tense. One inevitably recalls Carolyn Abbate's famous claim that 'music seems not to "have a past tense"'. 'Can we conceive of some musical phenomenon that has the power of a preterite tense to represent instantaneously the already happened?' she asks. 'Does music have a *way of speaking* that enables us to hear it constituting or projecting events as past?'[45] Her answer seems to be generally 'no' (although some exceptional instances when music works in conjunction with literary narrative or dramatic staging may hold out potential glimpses of this chimerical musical past tense). With regard to her first question, about tense, it would be hard to disagree with her answer. One might add only that thinking in terms of grammatical tense is neither the most apposite nor the most useful means for considering temporality in instrumental music.

Posing the question in mildly overstated manner: does tense really exist? Or rather, is tense a fundamental part of reality? Contemporary philosophers of time dispute whether time is indeed tensed (if it even exists). Those espousing the so-called B-theory, the position that probably inspires the most consensus among current analytic philosophers of time, would say that it is not.[46] Some languages (such as Chinese), after all, have no real equivalent to the past or future tenses found in modern European languages; meaningful verbal utterances implicating the past may be made without recourse to tensed verbal conjugations.[47] Even if language and linguistic meaning were inherently tensed, it is highly questionable how far one might wish to apply linguistic analogies to music. Music may justly be argued to be a

[44] Robert Hatten discusses the connection between pastoral topic and temporality in 'From Topic to Premise and Mode: The Pastoral in Schubert's Piano Sonata in G major, D.894', *Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert* (Bloomington, IN, 2004), 53–67.

[45] Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ, 1991), 52–3.

[46] The reference is to the second of McTaggart's three series – that denoting qualities of 'earlier' and 'later' without reference to notions of past, present or future (the 'A' series). See John McTaggart, 'The Unreality of Time', *Mind*, 68 (1908), 457–74.

[47] See David Hugh Mellor, 'The Unreality of Tense', *The Philosophy of Time*, ed. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (Oxford, 1993), 47–59, and, for a general introduction to this topic, *Questions of Time and Tense*, ed. Robin Le Poidevin (Oxford, 1998). Stranger ideas are conceivable;

pre-linguistic, precognitive mode of understanding.[48] It is not as if verbal language possesses the capability to explain music fully or adequately, that music should be seen as derivative of language, a lesser or more basic form of it. Tense in the linguistic sense is unhelpful and clumsy here. Not only does a past tense appear not to exist in music, but the very analogy, when posed outside Abbate's immediate context of music and narrative, is moreover misconceived.[49]

Tense seems to provide a red herring, not a thread. Abbate's second question, however, 'does music have a *way of speaking* that enables us to hear it constituting or projecting events as past?', even if seemingly phrased as merely a rhetorical amplification of the preceding question, seems distinct from the first. This may be addressed by a slightly circuitous route.

Coming at the problem from a different tack, a more pertinent and indeed fundamental question than that of tense is whether or not memories are actually past at all. Aristotle does not say that they are past, merely that memories relate to events which are past. Similarly, that other great theorist of time Augustine famously held that the present consists of three times – a present of things past (memory), a present of things present (perception) and a present of things to come (expectation).[50] But, as Aristotle notes, this gives rise to a potential problem. Memory involves the paradox of the presence of absence. If the remembered object is present, it is perceived in the present and therefore is not past and cannot be a memory. If it is absent, then there is no object. This is solved for him by the idea of an image (εἰκών) before the mind – the presence of a copy of the absent object of memory, which may apply for sound just as for a visual image. Thus for millennia memory has been linked with the faculty of imagination.[51] This 'wax-imprint' model has been disputed by some theorists (most significantly, perhaps, Henri Bergson), though it remains relevant to this day as a more 'primitive' model for contemporary theories of memory storage in neuroscience.[52]

just think of the invented idealist languages without nouns in Jorge Luis Borges's short story 'Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius' (*The Garden of Forking Paths*, 1941). On the complementary idea that grammatical tense might often have little to do with the experience of time, see Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, 3 vols. (Chicago, IL, 1985), ii, 61–77.

[48] See especially Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche* (Manchester, 2003), and *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity* (Cambridge, 2007).

[49] For a complementary critique of Abbate's use of tense in music, see also the brief recent account by Leo Treitler in *Reflections on Musical Meaning and its Representations* (Bloomington, IN, 2011), 24–6.

[50] Augustine, *Confessions*, 11.20.(26), trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford, 1998), 235.

[51] Aristotle, *On Memory*, 450b11–451a3, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Barnes, i, 716.

[52] The wax-imprint analogy was used earlier by Plato in the *Theaetetus*, 191c; see Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN, and Cambridge, MA, 1997), 212. As Abbate goes on to note, citations of earlier music refer to artefacts from the past, but do not thereby create a past tense (*Unsung Voices*, 54).

In his lecture series entitled *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, Edmund Husserl notes that

> Present memory is a phenomenon wholly analogous to perception. It has the appearance of the object in common with the corresponding perception. However, in the case of memory the appearance has a modified character, by virtue of which the object stands forth not as present but as having been present.[53]

If the image of the object of memory is present to the mind, perceived in the now, what then differentiates the present perception of the image of memory from reality? Philosophers in the empiricist tradition such as Berkeley and Hume have generally seen the difference between present perception and memory as being merely a matter of degree of intensity.[54] Though such accounts would probably appear inadequate now as a comprehensive definition, their point still highlights an important distinction in how memory, approached phenomenologically, differs from present perception. The image, the object of memory, is part of the present, though it relates to the past. It must somehow be marked in context as being unreal, weaker, a copy – as Husserl would say, it possesses an 'as if' quality. Hence, in turn, we see why memories and dreams have long been associated with one another.

Musical memories are therefore context dependent. (To this extent they are just like those languages without a past tense.) They must possess a past marking, a modality of pastness, whether implied gesturally, topically or by some other means. They exhibit Abbate's '*way of speaking* that enables us to hear [music] constituting or projecting events as past'. This 'way of speaking' may be signed in numerous ways. Taking our cue from Berkeley and Hume, the status as memory might be indicated by a difference in intensity. Hence we find such familiar devices as music being heard more weakly through the use of a *pianissimo* dynamic; of timbral weakening (*una corda* pedal for the piano, *sul ponticello* effects); of spatial distance in instrumentation (played only on the back desks of the violins or offstage); of a melodic line surrounded by haze (*tremolo* or tonally obfuscatory harmony) or

[53] Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, trans. James Churchill (The Hague, 1964), § 28: 'Memory and Figurative Consciousness – Memory as Positing Reproduction', 83–4 (p. 83).

[54] See George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (Harmondsworth, 1988), §§ 30, 33, pp. 63–4; David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Harmondsworth, 1985), Bk I, Pt I, § III: 'Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination', 56–7. The idea is implicit in Locke but undeveloped there. Husserl's account offers some congruence with this view (see *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, § 21: 'Levels of Clarity of Reproduction', 71–2), but overall is more complex and would not translate easily for music (*ibid.*, §§ 14–27 and Appendix III; and Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, 1983), §§ 99–103, 141, pp. 243–51, 338–40).

lacking the reality of true grounding (in inversion, without bass support).[55] In the A minor Quartet this might help us isolate and explain a peculiar and distinctive feature: the fact that all four movements open *pianissimo* (the middle two also end thus, with a further *diminuendo*). The opening of Schubert's work offers a dreamlike way into experience, the fainter echo of a beautiful world already lost.[56] Einstein has sympathetically observed in this vein that the two bars before the entry of the melody 'consist of nothing more than harmony, resolved into quiet figuration, and rhythm, isolating the movement, setting it apart and lifting it into a dream-world'. It is as if Schubert wanted to emphasize what music meant to him: 'a moment of ordained time, wrested from eternity and projected into eternity again'.[57]

Alternatively, there may be something elusive about the musical present, a sense of stasis or at least the lack of any dynamic, forward-looking quality. Echoing criticism levelled earlier by Hans Költzsch, for Schubert the theme appears to consist as its own end, not to form a means to a higher end or goal ('Selbstzweck, nicht Mittel zum Zweck').[58] Perhaps inevitably, this diagnosis is made to contrast with the temporal sense provided by middle-period Beethoven. As Dahlhaus notably formulates it: 'In Schubert, unlike in Beethoven, the most lasting impression is made by remembrance, which turns from later events back to earlier ones, and not by goal consciousness, which presses on from earlier to later.'[59] Rather than a means to attain a triumphant future, the music dwells on itself, and thus might seem loosely compatible or analogous with memory. Scott Burnham, one of the few scholars to ask in any depth how Schubert conjures up the musical sensation of memory, draws on this same orientation towards the present moment, its sensuous immediacy.[60]

This attention to the present or retention of the past at the expense of the protention of a coming future is commonly construed as resulting from Schubert's characteristic

[55] Similar effects may be seen in cinema (which has also been said to possess no tense): black and white or soft focus gives the stylistic impression of pastness, blurring from one scene to another the movement between different temporal levels.

[56] Although tense has just been forbidden, the pluperfect of Schiller's 'Resignation' is an irresistible (though probably spurious) analogy: 'Auch ich *war* in Arkadia geboren.'

[57] Einstein, *Schubert*, 285. Peter Pesic similarly notes the idea of D.960's opening as dreamlike, as if the music had been ongoing for some time ('Schubert's Dream', *19th-Century Music*, 23 (1999–2000), 136–144 (p. 138)).

[58] Hans Költzsch, *Franz Schuberts Klaviersonaten* (Leipzig, 1927), 77. Intentionally or otherwise, Költzsch raises the spectre of Kant in his terminology. The ironic implication would be that such a theme, being its own end or telos, may be aligned with the category of the aesthetic.

[59] Dahlhaus, 'Sonata Form in Schubert', 8. Dahlhaus does, however, make the important proviso that the 'teleological energy characteristic of Beethoven's contrasting derivation is surely not absent from Schubert, but is perceptibly weaker'.

[60] Scott Burnham, 'Schubert and the Sound of Memory', *Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 655–63 (pp. 661–3).

type of motivic working, repetition and lyricism.[61] As its reception would suggest, reading a static or even retrospective quality into Schubert's music seems for many listeners inherently correct. Still, it is difficult to substantiate quite why this should be the case; the primarily synchronic, score-based analytical method, indifferent to 'tense', struggles to grapple with the diachronic, 'tensed' properties of memory.[62] If one finds close connections between themes and subtle motivic working (as one frequently will, if one looks for it, in Schubert, just as in Beethoven), what is to distinguish this between passive memory and active development? Suzannah Clark rightly questions why Schubert's motivic technique in the first movement of the G major Quartet should be interpreted by Dahlhaus backwards, nostalgically, rather than forwards (as with Beethoven). Her conclusion is that at best, 'according to Dahlhaus, a moment is a memory if it can be shown in analytical terms to be non-structural'.[63] (In this context, one might think that Dahlhaus's alternative concept of 'subthematicism' seems just as pertinent to Schubert as to late Beethoven; however, he appears reluctant to consider Schubert's music from this purportedly Beethovenian perspective.)

Yet another technique utilized by Schubert is the modified repetition of ideas in which the backdrop or emotive connotation is changed, which might suggest the subjective, mutable quality of memory. The object stays the same, but our perspective, our interpretation of it, changes. Memory here is not passive but rather constructive. Such could appear the magical shift from A minor to A major in bar 13 of the 'Rosamunde' Quartet's first movement. Edward T. Cone's celebrated remark that 'formal repetitions are often best interpreted as representations of events rehearsed in memory' – a comment, not for nothing, made in the context of an article on Schubert – is on to the same point.[64] A similar procedure is provided by Schubert's favoured technique of recasting a melodic contour of pitches in new tonal context, of which the opening movement of the B♭ Piano Sonata, D.960, is a classic case in point.[65]

[61] On the relation of form, thematicism, temporality, lyricism and logic in Schubert, see further the insightful accounts given by Poundie Burstein, 'Lyricism, Structure, and Gender in Schubert's G major String Quartet', *Musical Quarterly*, 81 (1997), 51–63, and Mak, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and the Poetics of the Lyric'.

[62] I am using 'tense' in a broader, non-grammatical sense here to describe the A-series qualities of temporal modality – past, present, future. As noted earlier, memory is arguably not tensed in the specific linguistic meaning of the term, but somehow still carries connotations of pastness.

[63] Suzannah Clark, *Analyzing Schubert* (Cambridge, 2011), 174; see further the same author's 'On the Imagination of Tone in Schubert's *Liedesend* (D473), *Trost* (D523), and *Gretchens Bitte* (D564)', *The Oxford Handbook of Neo-Riemannian Theories*, ed. Edward Gollin and Alexander Rehding (New York, 2011), 294–321.

[64] Edward T. Cone, 'Schubert's Promissory Note: An Exercise in Musical Hermeneutics', *19th-Century Music*, 5 (1981–2), 233–41 (p. 240), repr. in *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies*, ed. Walter Frisch (Lincoln, NE, 1986), 13–30 (p. 27).

[65] Numerous examples of such reinterpretation of pitches and the general contours of melodic lines can be found throughout the movement, from the opening melody, its G♭ major recasting in bars 19–23, the C♯ minor transformation initiating the development (bars 117–21), and finally the sleight of

Clark has also noted how each time a specific pitch recurs in Schubert (such as in the first movements of D.887 or D.956) it may have a different quality to it. Just as an entire melodic idea can be reclad in new harmonic surroundings, so a single pitch may be presented in different harmonic hues. 'This technique generates the sense of reminiscence, as an important pitch of the past is recast within the present harmonic context.'[66]

Possibly, as is often the case with Schubert, it is partly the way in which this 'memory' is reached – the way in which it appears set off from the perceived temporal modality of the surrounding music – that marks it out as unreal.[67] As I will suggest below, it is more the analogy with the form of remembering that is constitutive of the music's status as memory, not its actual content. The effect of the stretched, elongated bar near the opening of D.804's Menuetto in moving between different temporal modalities has already been noted. A different, though related, effect may be found at the close of the A major Sonata, D.959. The finale's rondo theme returns at the start of the coda, initially as if whole and complete, but then recurring in broken, tonally drifting fragments, punctuated by silence, as if the strength of the object of memory is dissipating. (This theme might already remind the listener of Schubert's earlier *Im Frühling*, D.882.[68])

Above all, Schubert achieves this detachment of the musical present from a sense of dynamic temporal flow through his famed use of harmony, found especially in his penchant for unusual harmonic slippage, or the way in which the apparition may continually slip through equal-octave divisions – maximally smooth cycles – which lack an apparent grounding.[69] This may be allied with Schubert's noted propensity for large-scale sequences, whose *locus classicus* must be the

hand in the recapitulation, bars 234–42, where following the earlier duality and the famous mirage of the retransition's bars 193–203 Schubert effects a seamless move from G♭ to A major by interchanging mid-phrase variants previously heard on $\hat{1}$ and $\hat{3}$. See on this last point the brief but perceptive account in Nicholas Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, 125 (2000), 248–70 (p. 258).

[66] Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, 181–2. This point obviously blurs the distinction between the listener's retention of pitch – 'actual' memory – and a figurative remembering of the 'musical subject'.

[67] Similarly, in the context of Beethoven's cyclic returns, Kristina Muxfeldt remarks that 'it is the staging of the return as much as the return itself that invites us to hear the passage as a memory' ('Music Recollected in Tranquillity: Postures of Memory in Beethoven', *Vanishing Sensibilities: Essays in Reception and Historical Restoration – Schubert, Beethoven, Schumann* (New York, 2011), 118–47 (p. 144)).

[68] The procedure, moreover, is further reminiscent of the rondo finale in Beethoven's op. 31 no. 1, which, as scholars such as Cone and Rosen have demonstrated, was the model for Schubert's movement. Edward T. Cone, 'Schubert's Beethoven', *Musical Quarterly*, 56 (1970), 779–93 (pp. 782–7); Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style* (London, 1971), 456–8.

[69] See Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen, 'Die Sonatenform im Spätwerk Franz Schuberts', *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*, 45 (1988), 16–49 (pp. 47–8).

development section of the E♭ Piano Trio, D.929. The circling through parts of equal-interval cycles which are themselves taken up in larger sequence provides a dizzying kaleidoscope of harmonies, a tonal weightlessness in which the underlying grounding on the simple functional progression IV–I–V is only abstractly derivable.[70] The auditory temporal experience is both static and hypnotically repetitive, dreamlike and dissociated.

Thus we can provide some answers to Abbate's question: 'Can music, though it exists always in the present moment, create the sound of pastness?'[71] In all of these instances the connection is more or less metaphorical. The musical procedures are obviously analogous to long-standing theories of memory, but this is not to claim that the music *is* memory – merely that one can understand why it might readily be interpreted as such. In certain cases one might doubt the reality of this analogy or question its abuse by earlier writers. But nonetheless, music, Schubert's especially, is undeniably often heard as invoking memory, and hence something about it must be sufficiently suggestive of the comparison.[72]

Music's remembering subject

As some of the preceding examples have already demonstrated, the marking of a given musical passage as somehow unreal, set off from 'normal' musical time and thus offering affordance with the notion of musical memory, may often be achieved as much through the way in which it is reached as through its immanent qualities. This brings us conveniently back to the subject/object division in the perception of memory. If musical memories may often be most demonstrable through the way in which they materialize, their secret would seem to lie as much in the hypothetical perceiving subject as in the putative object of perception. It is worth broadening our inquiry now into the nature of the subject remembering.

Throughout much of the preceding discussion the nature of the subject doing the remembering has remained unstated and unexplored. Frequently a human subject has been implied, whether an average present-day listener, Schubert himself, or an ideal listener with access to a wealth of arcane contextual knowledge and occasional excess of credulity. Although the precise mechanisms by which humans remember

[70] In D.929 the music works up (through alternating major and minor triads) by minor thirds built as diminished sevenths on the (non-present) functional roots IV, I and V respectively, viz. B–D–F (on A♭); F♯–A–C (on E♭); D♭–E–G (on B♭). The entire development section effectively prolongs the functional harmonic progression IV–I–V, but in a non-functional, unrecognizable manner. As a result, neo-Riemannian analysts invariably have a field day with this movement. Also see Scott Burnham's wonderfully apposite analysis of the finale of the G major Quartet in 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth: Schubert and the Burden of Repetition', *19th-Century Music*, 29 (2005–6), 31–41 (p. 36).

[71] Abbate, *Unsung Voices*, 54.

[72] The justification here is mildly circular, but meaning is inevitably socially constructed and circular.

are still being unravelled, we indubitably do have the capacity to remember and can safely leave the details of the means by which we do this to cognitive psychology. What on the other hand remains to be developed here in a work concerning the philosophy of music is the notion of music remembering, which raises the important issue of subjectivity – the regulative fiction of music as an autonomous persona.

One of the most persistent metaphors in accounts of Romantic music is that of music speaking to us in a first-person 'voice', the idea of the anthropomorphic musical subject, of music somehow exuding its own consciousness. The inclination of the A minor Quartet towards the lyrical, the songlike tone of its opening, would seem only to encourage this link with subjectivity. The first violin, after waiting affectedly for two bars, steps forward to express its lyrical utterance – a speaking voice. If it be granted that music may be understood as a hypothetical subject exhibiting traits of consciousness, it is obviously not such a great step further to positing that it may remember earlier events occurring within its course. The recurrence of earlier themes or events thus becomes akin to stylized memories; it is not just that we remember the themes but that the music may appear to remember its own earlier self.[73]

An obvious case in point is the recurrence of themes across multi-movement pieces using cyclic form. Perhaps the clearest example of this cyclic technique in Schubert can be found in the work just discussed, the Piano Trio in E♭, where the recurrence of the second movement's mournful cello theme (apparently based on a Swedish folksong) in the finale creates a moment of acute pathos, of unrelenting melancholy – the inability to escape from the past. But need this be a memory? Does this imply the music is speaking as the lyric 'I'? In some cases memory seems an appropriate analogy (Beethoven's op. 101 or Ninth Symphony, Schubert's Violin Fantasy in C, those extraordinary early works of Mendelssohn from the same decade), but cyclic recall need not be interpreted as memory, even if one persists with the idea of musical subjectivity.[74] Just as germane for D.929 might be the idea of fatalistic return, the folksong as something external to the musical subject's consciousness,

[73] For an overview of the concept of musical subjectivity, see Michael P. Steinberg, *Listening to Reason: Culture, Subjectivity, and Nineteenth-Century Music* (Princeton, NJ, 2004), 4–11, and Benedict Taylor, *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory: The Romantic Conception of Cyclic Form* (Cambridge, 2011), 26–31. Subjectivity is also a commonly encountered term within New Musicological accounts of Schubert: see, for instance, Susan McClary, 'Constructions of Subjectivity in Schubert's Music', *Queering the Pitch: The New Gay and Lesbian Musicology*, ed. Philip Brett, Elizabeth Wood and Gary Thomas (New York, 1994), 205–34, and Lawrence Kramer, *Franz Schubert: Sexuality, Subjectivity, Song* (Cambridge, 2003).

[74] See Julian M. Johnson, 'The Subjects of Music: A Theoretical and Analytical Enquiry into the Construction of Subjectivity in the Musical Structuring of Time' (D.Phil. dissertation, University of Sussex, 1994), 25–49; Sisman, 'Memory and Invention at the Threshold of Beethoven's Late Style'; and Muxfeldt, 'Music Recollected in Tranquillity'.

even time as being something cyclical. In many works such as the A minor Quartet, it is rather less obvious that any purported similarity or connection between movements may be heard as constituting a memory.[75] Part of this seems to lie in how active or passive the musical subject appears to be – the question of agency.

One of the most characteristic forms of Schubertian cyclicism can be found in the Quartet in G, D.887. In the second movement, the outbreak of tremolos in the contrasting minor section is strongly reminiscent of the opening of the first movement, allied with its familiar unison dotted rhythms and stern minor mode following in the wake of the major. Is this merely a memory of the first movement, or may not both movements be heard, rather, as similar responses to a putative external cause? Similarly, in the third movement and near the end of the finale, the fact that the echoes or reverberations of this idea consist not of the recall of identical themes but of a similar, allusive harmonic gesture (major to minor), dotted minor arpeggiation and a tremolo *Klang*, suggests the manifestation of similar reactions to a common deeper psychological cause, itself unstated. Somehow the actual object of memory is hidden, at a deeper, subconscious level. It is active, but unheard; the music passively absorbs its aftershocks. (The possibility of a Freudian reading – the affordance with the idea of trauma, hidden in the subconscious id – is readily suggested: the cyclic metamorphosis of material is comparable to dreamwork, Schubert tapping into a deep, subconscious psychological process in his music.) The distorted cyclic echoes are not subjective musical memories so much as objective reverberations in the musical subject. The dynamic course of the music suggests a sympathetic mirror (*Abbild*, Schopenhauer would say) of a deep and multilevelled psychological process, the response to returning darker thoughts or situations. In other words, one might say the music mirrors the form of memory, of remembering, not its content.

This contention affords well with a perceptive and persuasive argument made by Burnham that Schubert's ability to suggest memory in music is due in part to his capacity to 'invest the surface of his music with a compellingly opaque materiality, such that we attend *to* it and not *through* it'.[76] The musical surface need not constitute a memory itself, even though the concentration on its beauty, appearing in the transient present, could give rise to the sense of nostalgia. Our perception of the music takes on a form analogous to our attending to memories – the processes are comparable. The sympathy with the dynamic process of remembering easily affords the comparison. (One may also note the correlation here with so-called dynamic or

[75] Cyclic works that transform material (such as the 'Wanderer' Fantasy) are already less likely to be heard as forming memories; if anything, their procedures of thematic development suggest orientation towards the future. There are many other examples of references, allusions and echoes between movements in Schubert (see Martin Chusid, 'Schubert's Cyclic Compositions of 1824', *Acta musicologica*, 36 (1964), 37–45). The close of the Piano Sonata in A, D.959, is one of the clearest: it returns in retrograde to the chord progression opening its first movement, a palindromic conception which seems rather too objective, too architectural, for memory metaphors.

[76] Burnham, 'Schubert and the Sound of Memory', 662–3.

sympathetic theories of musical expression, which were coming to prominence within German aesthetics by the turn of the nineteenth century.[77])

The argument above is not an either/or, though: it is possible to posit both types of musical memory as being applicable to a composition. First, we have the more straightforward conception of music as being equivalent to a subjective persona remembering, where thematic returns or allusions are equivalent to memories; secondly, the notion that music mirrors subjectivity itself, without its content (the object of memory) being audible. This latter point is particularly worth exploring at greater length.

One of the distinctive ways in which Schubert suggests this flow of consciousness in his music is in the apparent switching between different temporal levels, the interaction between different types or modalities of time. Rather like the reactive subject absorbing cyclic tremors in D.887, in the A minor Quartet there is a peculiar quality of passivity, even fatalistic acceptance, to the temporal unfolding of the first subject. Just as in the first movement of the 'Unfinished' Symphony, the repeated figurations of the ostinato accompaniment create a sense of the inevitable occurrence of events in time – time, or its offerings, is heard as something external, implacable, probably malign, an objective, impersonal medium into which the self is thrown. This conception is not one-sided: the sun may briefly – almost unexpectedly – shine (the A major transformation of the first subject, bars 23–31) before quickly melting away again. Yet all this happens, it seems, externally: the subject is a passive participant, who does not know and cannot control when the landscape may briefly lighten.[78] At best, we may enjoy this dream while we can. As Schiller writes:

> Des Lebens Mai blüht einmal und nicht wieder,
> Was man von der Minute ausgeschlagen,
> Gibt keine Ewigkeit zurück.[79]

[77] Charles Rosen offers an insightful discussion of this correlation between music, time, memory, landscape and expression, citing a review by Schiller describing how music, like landscape painting, represents feelings through its form, not (as in earlier aesthetics) through its content. As Hegel would later claim, for Schiller 'the entire effect of music […] consists in accompanying and making perceptible the inner movements of the spirit analogously through outer ones' (*The Romantic Generation*, 126–31 (p. 127)). Cf. Hegel: 'The chief task of music consists in making resound, not the objective world itself, but, on the contrary, the *manner* in which the inmost self is moved to the depths of its personality and conscious soul' (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. Thomas Malcolm Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1975), ii, 891; my emphasis).

[78] This is consciously alluding to the light–shadow/major–minor analogy that threads its way throughout Schubert reception. A pertinent early example may be found in Grove: 'With Schubert the minor mode seems to be synonymous with trouble, and the major with relief; and the mere mention of the sun, or a smile, or any other emblem of gladness, is sure to make him modulate. Some such image was floating before his mind when he made the beautiful change to A major near the beginning of the A minor Quartet' (*Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn*, ed. Blom, 246). The image also evinces a close connection with landscape metaphors (see below).

[79] Schiller, 'Resignation', verses 2, 18, *Sämtliche Werke*, i, 129–32 (pp. 129, 131).

(Life's May blooms once and never more,
What one spurns from the moment,
Eternity never gives back.)

Within this inexorable unfolding of predetermined destiny, one fitfully obtains the uncanny sense of being caught in a loop. The phrase construction of the first group is a case in point; an eight-bar antecedent (bars 3–10) is succeeded not by the expected consequent phrase but by yet another antecedent (bars 11–22), this time internally expanded, closing once again on an imperfect dominant. This is followed at last by the consequent phrase, but one that now, miraculously, is in the major (and thus hardly conforms to that of a normative period in A minor) – a vain hope sternly rebuked at the cadence. Somehow we have remained stuck in the first theme's ambit for longer than usual (see Example 4).[80] Similarly, the erstwhile transition (from bar 32) soon finds itself starting over again (in bar 44) without having achieved the harmonic goal its transitional rhetoric would lead us to expect, and despite the greater tonal mobility of the cycle of fifths and energy gain provided by the contrapuntal element introduced, neither does the second attempt leave A minor until the last moment (bar 54). Such repetitions might also explain how, at a larger level, the return to the first subject at the start of D.804's development section – just as with that of the 'Unfinished' Symphony – sounds so fate-laden in effect.[81] Generically, it is hardly unusual to return to the first subject at this point. Presumably the rematerializing of those dark, insidiously repeated rhythms that had momentarily been left behind by the second theme's softer lyricism creates the feeling of inescapable destiny, the subject being enfolded in a larger loop of cyclic recurrence.

This distinctive temporal sense connects with the overriding theme of fatalistic circularity or wandering to be found within accounts of Schubert's music. In Cone's words, Schubert's music after 1822 is permeated throughout by a sense of 'desolation and dread', a feature usually interpreted as a response to the onset of

[80] This structure is indeed normalized in the recapitulation by excising the redundant second antecedent, the result being a curiously balanced – or even dualistic – pairing of minor–major periodic subphrases. Burnham speaks of this deliberate redundancy in Schubert's music in the context of how he seems to make a virtue out of sheer length. Scott Burnham, 'The "Heavenly Length" of Schubert's Music', *Ideas*, 6/1 (1999), <http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/ideasv61/burnham.htm>, accessed 29 October 2013. Of course a more technical wording of this point might praise Schubert for his manipulation of phrase structure: by using a series of lyrical but open-ended forms Schubert succeeds in creating a dynamic harmonic tension while maintaining a constant lyricism.

[81] Einstein helpfully avers that Schubert was 'thinking of death' here (*Schubert*, 285).

Example 4. Schubert: String Quartet in A minor ('Rosamunde'), D.804, first movement, bars 1–43.



Example 4 (continued)



Example 4 (continued)



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

syphilis in the composer and his realization of the inevitability of an early death.[82] In technical terms this is instantiated by a particular use of repeated movement, most typically a walking or trudging figure (as in 'Gute Nacht' and 'Der Wegweiser' from *Winterreise* or the first Impromptu, op. 90/D.899). It gives the sense of an unrelenting movement towards a preordained goal, inevitable and implacable –

[82] Cone, 'Schubert's Promissory Note', 28. On this topic of wandering and fatalism, see, for instance, William Kinderman, 'Schubert's Tragic Perspective', *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies*, ed. Frisch, 65–83; *idem*, 'Wandering Archetypes in Schubert's Instrumental Music', *19th-Century Music*, 21 (1997–8), 208–22; Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, esp. chapter 3, 'The Wanderer's Tracks' (pp. 60–80); and Jeffrey Perry, 'The Wanderer's Many Returns: Schubert's Variations Reconsidered', *Journal of Musicology*, 19 (2002), 374–416.

eliding physical motion with a fatalistic temporal sense. In other pieces the seemingly inevitable unfolding of events withdraws into an underlying pulse or framework, such as in the first movement of the A minor Sonata, D.784, or the present quartet in the same key. The music here is not simply an autonomous subject with agency, but may be seen to be one reacting to external events – events which are yet still 'in' the music. The musical subject thus becomes divided, simultaneously subject and object, active and reactive – rather like the divided modern self that has stalked philosophical attempts to define personal identity since Hume.

The converse seems to be those moments of subjective interiority – movements to a different, inner realm, another temporal or aesthetic level that apparently does not have to obey external laws or temporal causality. The music exhibits a greater sense of agency here, something closely allied with subjectivity, consciousness's ability to move at will through past time, to repeat, to dream. This quality is especially characteristic of Schubert's second subjects. In the A minor Quartet the sense of relaxation from the unremitting temporal succession of the preceding music is palpable in the secondary theme beginning at bar 59. The five-bar phrase lengths lie outside the regular hypermetric divisions of clock time, and though elements of the earlier music are not entirely absent there is a new feeling of lyrical generosity that breaks free of the previous objective fatalism. The subject appears to fill out time by its own plenitude, create it actively through its own activity, not simply exist in it passively with resigned acceptance of what time may bring. Such qualities are even more evident in the famous secondary theme of the String Quintet's three-key exposition (an inner plateau of E♭ hovering between C and G, a 'time out of time'), the massive interior loop of D.887's second group, and the second theme of the 'Unfinished'.[83]

That this escape from an external reality to an interior time may yet be an illusion in the quartet is projected by the continuance not only of gestures redolent of earlier material (the quavers in the viola reminiscent of the second violin's opening accompaniment, the reintroduction of triplets with imitation at the fifth in bar 69) but also by the hint of phrase circularity that has not been entirely abandoned. In effect, Schubert is working with two time senses simultaneously – an external, implacable objective time and a warmer inner, subjective time; he reveals how the former persists in some subtle form throughout the latter. Such an interpretation might be supported by Charles Rosen's astute analysis of Schubert's fluid movement between external time and internal memory in *Gretchen am Spinnrade*. Schubert's originality of conception is how he represents the poetry phenomenologically:

[83] Taruskin claims this last instance – probably Schubert's must beloved melody – could even be excised completely from the music with no functional loss (*The Oxford History of Western Music*, iii, 110).

> It is not the spinning that is objectively imitated by Schubert but Gretchen's consciousness of it […]. Schubert was able to represent a double time-scale, a relationship so crucial to Romantic poetry, both the sense of the immediate present and the power of past memory and how they interact with each other.[84]

The implications of such shifts for understanding the temporality of Schubert's music have not been lost on other writers. Robert Hatten suggests that 'tonal music has an independent capacity to cue various temporal realms by means of sharp musical oppositions, not only in mode, but in key, theme, topic, texture, meter, tempo, and style as well'. This Hatten links to different psychological states, such as the widely held belief that the opposition between major and minor in Schubert's music represents a conflict between present tragic reality and a happier past.[85] Taking up this theme, Kristina Muxfeldt has further commented on Schubert's unsurpassed 'ability to represent the inner movement of experience in sound': 'In the frequent shifts in mode in *Winterreise*, carefully calibrated to distinguish events as the wanderer's memories, fantasies, or present experiences, modulation through tonal space is used with unparalleled effect to mimic the movements of inner experience.'[86]

The secret behind this switching between different levels commonly lies in Schubert's use of transitions – or rather, his non-use of them. As noted, here in D.804, for a long time the 'transition' actually goes nowhere. One calls it a transition only on account of its formal position and rhetoric, although it shuns fulfilling the harmonic function it seemingly promises (an even better example of this

[84] Charles Rosen, 'Schubert's Inflections of Classical Form', *The Cambridge Companion to Schubert*, ed. Gibbs, 72–98 (p. 77). The *Gretchen* parallel is apt for the A minor Quartet's opening movement, which similarly comes to a shuddering climax over a diminished seventh at its midpoint (bar 140).

[85] Hatten, 'From Topic to Premise and Mode', 55. One of innumerable examples is provided by Reinhold Hammerstein with specific reference to *Die Götter Griechenlands*: 'The minor normally represents grey reality, the banality of the present, pain and suffering; the major, in contradistinction, the world of beauty, of dreams, former happiness and lost love, and not least the consolation of death' ('"Schöne Welt, wo bist du?": Schiller, Schubert und die Götter Griechenlands', *Musik und Dichtung: Neue Forschungsbeiträge (Festschrift Viktor Pöschl zum 80. Geburtstag)*, ed. Michael von Albrecht and Werner Schubert (Frankfurt am Main, 1990), 305–30 (p. 314)).

[86] Kristina Muxfeldt: 'Schubert's Songs: The Transformation of a Genre', *The Cambridge Companion to Schubert*, ed. Gibbs, 121–37 (pp. 137, 126). On this temporal sense in Schubert's lieder, above all in *Winterreise*, see further Anthony Newcomb, 'Structure and Expression in a Schubert Song: *Noch einmal* Auf dem Flusse *zu hören*', *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies*, ed. Frisch, 153–74. Barbara R. Barry, in '"Sehnsucht" and Melancholy: Explorations of Time and Structure in Schubert's *Winterreise*', *The Philosopher's Stone: Essays in the Transformation of Musical Structure* (Hillsdale, NY, 2000), 181–203 (pp. 190–1), offers a brief but useful account of differing levels of time in *Winterreise* – Physical (external, regular 'norm'), Experiential (internal, psychological/subjective), Remembered ('Proustian') and Suspended ('where divisions of time through events and experiences are no longer real, and the modalities of past and future have dissolved into a continuous present').

duplicity will be found in D.960). The actual harmonic transition occupies a mere four bars of the 100-bar exposition. Customarily, Schubert will achieve this switch through his fabled love of enharmonic modulation. As Burnham says, Schubert's 'often sudden changes of key give us the sense of being instantly transported to another realm'. The new theme appears out of nowhere, approached through unusual modulation, slipped into through some magical harmonic portal.[87] Or, as Taruskin writes: 'It is like passing into another world, another quality of time, another state of consciousness.'[88]

Thus the temporal course of the music readily suggests multiple levels of time or consciousness. Rather than making one, linear projection through time (time's arrow), the music may enfold upon itself, loop back, move out of one time to another. Mak's reading of parataxis on a large scale is on to this point.[89] In fact, often the conception is not that different from the parenthetical insertion or moments of static dreaming time commentators have read into Beethoven's late music.[90]

Mark Evan Bonds has recently drawn attention to the historical growth of spatial representations of musical form, which depended on new conceptions of mapping time onto space. The idea of the timeline – that historical or narrative events in time may be represented linearly – is fairly recent in origin, dating to the mid-eighteenth century. Almost as soon as it appeared, it was lampooned by Laurence Sterne in *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy*, who proposed not unreasonably that no story could really be told in linear fashion: just as no one would travel 'from *Rome* all the way to *Loretto*, without ever once turning his head aside either to the right hand or to the left', so 'a historiographer could not drive on his history' without 'fifty deviations from a straight line' (see Figure 1).[91]

One might say the relation between present perception and memory or between external clock time and experienced time in Schubert often follows something akin to the narrative timelines jestingly drawn by Sterne in *Tristram Shandy*; but it is even more complex, as the two types of time – ontological and experienced – are in some respects incompatible. One can be represented in a Euclidean two-dimensional space, the other simply cannot.

[87] Burnham, 'The "Heavenly Length" of Schubert's Music'. Also see Susan Wollenberg, 'Schubert's Transitions', *Schubert Studies*, ed. Brian Newbould (Aldershot, 1998), 16–61, who categorizes the different, often 'magical' or special ways in which Schubert gets from one place to another.

[88] Taruskin, *The Oxford History of Western Music*, iii, 92–3.

[89] Mak, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and the Poetics of the Lyric', 301–2.

[90] See, for instance, Karol Berger, 'Beethoven and the Aesthetic State', *Beethoven Forum VII* (1999), 17–44.

[91] Laurence Sterne, *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman*, i (1759), chapter 14; Mark Evan Bonds, 'The Spatial Representation of Musical Form', *Journal of Musicology*, 27 (2010), 265–307 (pp. 281–2).



Figure 1. Sample timelines drawn by Laurence Sterne for his narrative in *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* (1759).

The reciprocity of metaphor

As the above discussion has demonstrated, accounts of memory quickly elide with ideas of temporality, and these may further blur into notions of consciousness without the latter explicitly speaking of memory. Alongside these three ideas, other familiar Schubertian tropes glide in and out, such as spatially based metaphors of landscape and wandering, and the analogy of dreams. This is a motley collection of musical metaphors, a real potpourri of Schubertian themes; one might wonder if they are somehow connected. Are they equivalent, offering multiple ways of viewing the same musical object, or are some more appropriate than others? This fifth and final section will explore the reciprocity of memory, landscape, dreams and consciousness as instructive metaphors for describing salient qualities of Schubert's instrumental music, touching especially on the Piano Sonata in B♭, D.960.

The use of landscape metaphors to describe Schubert's music is well established. Grove, writing in 1880, already touches on this point in saying that Schubert's music 'changes with the words as a landscape does when sun and clouds pass over it'.[92] This trope would be taken up even more readily by Adorno:

> When it comes to Schubert's music we speak of 'landscape'. […] The ex-centric construction of that landscape, in which every point is equally close to the centre, reveals itself to the wanderer walking round it with no actual progress. […] Those themes know of no history, but only shifts in perspective: the only way they change is through a change of light.[93]

[92] Grove, *Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn*, ed. Blom, 241.

[93] Adorno, 'Schubert', trans. Dunsby and Perrey, 7, 10.

Dahlhaus, with a nod to both Adorno and Rilke, holds that successive variations 'form a cycle insofar as they draw circles, ever expanding circles, around the theme. The variation principle as such is not goal-orientated, but rather resembles a commentary "meandering" about the theme, illuminating it from different sides.'[94] Mak finds that 'Schubert's paratactic repetitions continually revisit the same subject from different perspectives', while Burnham claims Schubert 'gives us time to take in his themes, as if they were works of visual art we could inspect at our leisure, or landscapes through which we could wander'.[95]

As these interpretations imply, landscape connects with a sense of spatiality derived from Schubert's use of large sequences and repetition which offers multiple perspectives of the same object, the notion of movement (or wandering) occurring within a larger objective framework, ideas of sunlight and shade resulting from the interplay of major and minor. Most particularly the sense of time suggested by landscape is different and distinctive. It might appear far slower, static, almost – but not quite – timeless. The relationship of musical form to time is seen as resembling that of moving through a landscape. Within the horizon provided by the overall form the panorama is unchanging, though the successive viewpoints offer changing perspectives of prominent details.[96] Such is the prospect of the opening horn theme in the 'Great' C major Symphony, when encountered again at the close of the first movement, or the craggy opening chords of D.959, now viewed from the reverse perspective at the close of the sonata. Helpfully for Schubert, one can also look back or wander off on the wayside. Landscape is essentially space and only accidentally time. It is no wonder that, for Alfred Brendel, in Schubert's larger formal repetitions 'the listener is given the chance of wandering twice through virtually the same musical landscape'.[97] One cannot step into the same stream twice, but evidently can wander twice through the same landscape.

But the Schubertian geography is unusual. Burnham rightly comments that Schubert's music 'puts into play a different physics'.[98] The leisurely opening paragraphs of the late B♭ Sonata inhabit this peculiar space. The first phrase – in Tovey's words, 'a sublime theme of the utmost calmness and breadth' – is soon brought to a temporary

[94] Dahlhaus, 'Sonata Form in Schubert', 2. (Cf. Rainer Maria Rilke, *Das Stundenbuch*, 'Das Buch vom mönchischen Leben', lines 13–14: 'in wachsenden Ringen, / die sich über die Dinge ziehn'.)

[95] Mak, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and the Poetics of the Lyric', 303; Burnham, 'The "Heavenly Length" of Schubert's Music'.

[96] See Rosen's excellent account in *The Romantic Generation*, 124–204, esp. p. 194.

[97] Alfred Brendel, 'Schubert's Last Sonatas', *Alfred Brendel on Music: Collected Essays* (London, 2007), 153–215 (p. 161). I use the singular form in place of Brendel's 'landscapes', as may be found in an earlier manifestation of the essay in *The New York Review* (2 February 1989, 33). To wander twice through two different (albeit similar) landscapes would entail four traversals. Three would be plausible, as the exposition may be repeated, but – with the exception of the beautiful opening movement of the earlier A major Sonata, D.664 – the second halves of Schubert's sonata movements are generally not (and certainly not by Brendel).

[98] Burnham, 'The "Heavenly Length" of Schubert's Music'.

halt by the famous *pianissimo* G♭ trill in the bass.[99] Brendel sees the G♭ trill as 'the disclosure of a third dimension', and it certainly throws the expected linear course of the music onto a new plane (or plain).[100] But one could see problems besetting the music even before this rather obvious interruption. Take out the G♭ and play the resulting phrase, and it is evident that something has gone wrong with the music by the end of the sixth bar, certainly by the first beat of the seventh. The melody, initially so serene and self-assured, has come to a strange, almost aimless continuation, the harmonies returning twice to the tonic 6/4 at a premature stage in the harmonic phrase rhythm. The phrase structure is also disturbed, closing ineffectually on an imperfect cadence halfway through the third bar of the antecedent's continuation, with over four beats of empty metric time to fill up before the consequent phrase should start (see Example 5). (The unexpected materialization of the G♭ turns this into eight – with a fermata, too.) This noble, hymnlike melody has stalled. For the owner of one of the most celebrated 'melodic treasure chests' in compositional history this is not to be expected.[101] The G♭ is not simply an obtrusive external element that destroys the till-then perfect course of the music, but something which has filled in and to this extent gratefully obscured a hesitancy or problem already there (Hegelian dialectics would gleefully claim that it results from logical contradictions inherent in the opening concept).[102]

The consequent phrase offers a mild improvement. This time the continuation is less laboured; the return to the tonic is successfully effected, though it occurs again in a weaker 'feminine cadence' which now pushes the continuation phrase into a fifth bar. Three bars, five bars – the continuation still is not quite there. This time, the G♭ trill offers a way forward. Rather than recoil in alarm, the music decides to explore this curious new realm for itself. Now the familiar melodic line is reinterpreted in this new context of G♭ rather than B♭, on $\hat{3}$ rather than $\hat{1}$, and in fact it seems to find this quite pleasing. So much so, that the continuation just grows and grows. Through repetition and sequential working the music picks up energy. Even though the music has still been unable to come up with a completely satisfactory phrase to close its periodic structure, why not leave this setback behind and push on (while the going is good) to the secondary theme? It is turning into a transition. Where exactly G♭ major will lead to we still do not know, but the music is going somewhere at last. An enharmonic $G♭^7$ seems to herald a promising new turn of events – and all of a sudden the music tumbles back into B♭ and (even more unforeseen) the theme of the very opening.

[99] Donald Francis Tovey, 'Franz Schubert', *Essays and Lectures on Music*, ed. Hubert Foss (London, 1949), 103–33 (p. 119).

[100] Brendel, 'Schubert's Last Sonatas', 154.

[101] Adorno, 'Schubert', 10.

[102] On the trill's 'otherness' or alterity, see the consideration by Charles Fisk in 'What Schubert's Last Sonata Might Hold', *Music and Meaning*, ed. Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca, NY, and London, 1997), 179–200. It should be noted here that the original version of the theme in Schubert's draft manuscript was actually written without the first G♭ trill (Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', 255).

Example 5. Schubert: Sonata in B♭ major, D.960, first movement, bars 1–45.



Example 5 (continued)



Example 5 (continued)



It is as if, having finally left home after much hesitation, Schubert's wanderer has crossed the brow of the surrounding hills and is picking up speed and confidence on his travels. Earlier uncertainties and setbacks are put firmly behind him. Spying a stray enharmonic entity by the wayside, he turns a corner and there – suddenly – he sees his familiar village lying before him once again. Although he has been travelling the whole time with the sun behind him (save perhaps for its occasional obscuring by the distant thunderclouds Tovey alludes to in bars 8 and 19) and has surely gone some distance, space has looped around on itself and he finds himself back where he was.

The topography of this landscape is non-Euclidean. Or at least it is not merely three-dimensional but belongs to a higher order (like some weird conception of Escher), where our conventional understanding of musical 'space-time' becomes warped.[103] Such is Schubert's ability to slip into another key or realm, his harmonic

[103] On this idea of musical space and its relationship with the temporal dimension, see Robert P. Morgan, 'Musical Time / Musical Space', *Critical Inquiry*, 6 (1980), 527–38. A personal musing on conceptions of time and space in Schubert may be found in Dieter Schnebel, 'Klangräume – Zeitklänge: Zweiter Versuch über Schubert', *Musik-Konzepte Franz Schubert*, ed. Metzger and Riehn, 67–88.

sleights of hand, his transitions that go nowhere, that the compositional outcome confuses our understanding of musical time and space.

However, if Euclidean spatiality appears insufficient to describe Schubert's music, we might be simply coming close to Bergson's argument about time being qualitatively different from space. We instinctively attempt to understand time in terms of space, but this is to simplify a heterogeneous medium into a homogeneous one.[104] Here, memory may afford just as meaningful an analogy. Memory for Bergson is not actually 'in space', even though its events are all simultaneously present (which suggests the spatial metaphor); one may move at will between one memory and another.[105]

Although the distorted, unusual routes between musical events may be analysed as belonging to some curved, non-Euclidean musical space, they may just as easily be understood as constituting a dreamscape. Dreams are another class of things often associated with Schubert.[106] The blurring of familiar objects into each other, of temporal categories and space, and with it the apparent suspension of normal causal relations, allies Schubert's music with a dreamlike sense (here the pictorial analogy would be with some surrealist landscape by Dalí in which solid objects melt and flow and time itself dissipates to nothing). Dreams and memory have also long been closely connected through their static quality, their lack of presentness and temporal slippage of levels. Philosophers have traditionally found it hard to differentiate between the two. Not for nothing does Proust commence *A la recherche du temps perdu* with a description of the symbiotic blurring between sleep, dreams and memory.

Offering a different perspective, by moving by chain of association from dreams, via the interpretation of dreams and dream-work, to psychoanalysis (or in Proust, from approximately *Combray* to *Sodom and Gomorrah*), it would easily be possible to revisit in altered light the previous descriptive analysis of the B♭ Sonata's opening using Freudian theories of the subconscious mind alongside Cone's now highly loaded description of 'vice' in Schubert. The susceptibility for corruption is present in the music even before G♭ offers its allure, but as Cone informs us:

> The first step in yielding to a temptation is to investigate it. That is what happens here. One can imagine the protagonist becoming more and more fascinated by his discoveries,

[104] Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. Frank Lubecki Pogson (London, 1910). Of course, the Einsteinian conceptions of space-time alluded to above are incompatible with Bergson's theories.

[105] Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London, 1911).

[106] See Brendel's oft-cited comparison: Schubert composes 'like a sleepwalker […]. In Beethoven's music we never lose our bearings, we always know where we are; Schubert, on the other hand, puts us into a dream' ('Form and Psychology in Beethoven's Piano Sonatas', *Alfred Brendel on Music*, 42–57 (p. 45); cf. 'Schubert's Last Sonatas', 165); further, Susan Wollenberg, 'Schubert and the Dream', *Studi musicali*, 9 (1980), 135–50; Pesic, 'Schubert's Dream'; and Fisk, *Returning Cycles*.

> letting them assume control of his life as they reveal hitherto unknown and possibly forbidden sources of pleasure. When he is recalled to duty, he tries to put these experiences behind him and to sublimate the thoughts that led to them.[107]

The hammering chords of bars 34–5 and violent, gratuitous reassertion of B♭ is the superego asserting its authority over the erring ego, led into sin (or G♭ at the very least) by that mischievous id. The F♯ minor of the 'second theme' reveals the subsequent tragic alienation of the G♭ realm, the loss of the love object or a depreciation of the self typical of melancholy, while the 'correct' F major secondary theme proffered in its stead by the superego (i.e. the third theme) is purely conventional, a tawdry filling up of the required bars in what is the socially accepted norm for a partner key, which does not begin to quell the pathos of F♯ minor. Here, unlike many other three-key expositions (e.g. D.956), the second and third themes are not heard as existing in some dualistic though dependent relationship, but rather as incompatible alternatives inhabiting different levels: the self has become split.

''Tis pity, though, in this sublime world, that / pleasure's a sin, and sometimes sin's a pleasure.' For Cone, 'The past cannot remain hidden. What was repressed eventually returns and rises in the end to overwhelm him.'[108] That shunned G♭ arises suddenly, *fortissimo* (the retransition to exposition repeat). A repetition of the entire course thus far ensues (a process commonly suggestive of neurosis for Freud).[109] In the development this alienation of the self takes on new levels: a new theme, interpreted by Fisk as referring to the 1816 song *Der Wanderer*,[110] emerges, followed most tellingly by the extraordinary return to the first subject in the tonic (bar 193) which is yet heard as a mirage. The wanderer has returned home, only to find it unhomely; the alienation of the self from itself, of id from superego, is complete. And the real recapitulation? Cone continues:

> If one now apparently recovers self-control, believing that the vice has been mastered, it is often too late: either the habit returns to exert its domination in some fearful form, or the

[107] Cone, 'Schubert's Promissory Note', 26. Cone is describing the *Moment musical* in A♭, op. 94 no. 6, in connection with a hypothetical real-life explanation for this 'vice' based on Schubert's contracting of syphilis. Cone's reading seems remarkably prophetic of the controversy that would follow the publication of Maynard Solomon's article 'Franz Schubert and the Peacocks of Benvenuto Cellini', *19th-Century Music*, 12 (1988–9), 193–206. According to the reader's preference, the shimmer of G♭, Taruskin's purple flat submediant, may shine a lighter hue in my following account.

[108] Cone, 'Schubert's Promissory Note', 26.

[109] See Sigmund Freud, 'Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through', *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey, 22 vols. (London, 1953–74), xii (1955), 150: 'The patient reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he *repeats* it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.'

[110] Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, 78–9.

> effects of the early indulgence have left their indelible and painful marks on the personality – and frequently, of course, on the body as well.[111]

Nicholas Marston has ingeniously pointed out how in bar 254 the G♭ element is not eliminated or normalized into B♭ but rather the B♭ is made to sound like its other. The subversion lies in the fact 'that the peripheral, the deviant, might challenge and win out over the normative; indeed, that the normative might actively aspire to and attain that other realm'.[112] This wicked inclination has won out after all – at least temporarily. Some readers may well think this is all fanciful, that such broad and all-inclusive psychoanalytical concepts loosely applied to such a paradigmatic narrative archetype may explain everything and nothing – and of course it is; yet this reading fits the music about as well as memory, landscape or dreams.

And finally, we may cross the short strait that separates psychology from psychoanalysis. Schubert's music may readily be heard as a projection of consciousness and subjectivity. Many listeners have at least felt so. 'He has strains for the most subtle thoughts and feelings,' Schumann claimed, 'and innumerable as are the shades of human thought and action, so various is his music.'[113] Consciousness or subjectivity seems in many ways a good cover-all term for Schubertian analogical language. It may incorporate memory, the interaction of temporal levels in which memory operates, the projection of dreams, subconscious drives and psychopathology, and even landscape.

Maybe it is not memory as much as the shifting between different levels of consciousness that we encounter in D.887 and D.956. Somehow through his modulatory shifts Schubert is able to express something indescribable almost indescribably simply. It is not just the magical way in which he may move the listener into a warmer, inner dream-realm with his second subjects but also how, conversely, he is able to darken and fatalize already elegiac music. There is a moment in the Menuetto of the A minor Quartet, seemingly quite normal, in which the music moves through common-tone reinterpretation from V/A minor to C♯ minor. But this analytical description conveys nothing of the experience one obtains listening to this; by some mysterious means the bottom drops out, the despair suddenly gets even deeper. Again, there seems some connection with the movement of consciousness – a perceived psychological realism that partly explains this music's fascination. Schumann's contention of Schubert's psychologically rich and unusual connection of musical ideas surely conveys something accurate.[114]

[111] Cone, 'Schubert's Promissory Note', 27.

[112] Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', 265.

[113] Robert Schumann, *Gesammelte Schriften über Musik und Musiker*, ed. Martin Kreisig, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1949), i, 206.

[114] *Jugendbriefe von Robert Schumann*, ed. Clara Schumann (Leipzig, 1886), 82–3, cited by Daverio, 'One More Beautiful Memory of Schubert', 604.

In some ways spatial metaphors seem likewise inaccurate. As Burnham remarks on the landscapes of the Schubertian subject: 'These are not just spaces, they are subjectivized spaces, imaginary spaces.'[115] Landscape may be understood as a projection of subjectivity.[116] As noted above with regard to memory, the warped spaces of Schubert's musical landscapes suggest internal labyrinths. Schubert's music opens up the infinities of the self, the endless caverns of the ego's self-consciousness found in the idealist and Romantic philosophy of his day (or, for its sceptics, a hall of mirrors).

Thus, in certain instances, speaking of this music as exploring the depths of consciousness appears at least as appropriate as the use of memory or spatial metaphors. But consciousness seems even harder to theorize – less warm and user-friendly than memory, less visualizable than landscape. Moreover, in other cases, such as those involving nostalgia and allusion to earlier music discussed at the opening of this article, memory would evoke a stronger sympathetic resonance. It would be fairer to conclude that Schubert's music creates a distinctive musical fabric which may easily suggest a range of interpretations revolving around memory, subjective inwardness and the psychological chain of thoughts – analogies that can move effortlessly into each other, all of which are 'merely' metaphorical, and all of which may be revealing.

As this study, focusing on the A minor Quartet but quickly branching out to include a significant number of other pieces, has shown, there are multiple ways of understanding how memory and nostalgia may be constructed in Schubert's music. They are irreducible to one aspect, it seems – just as we have different types or mechanisms of memory, different understandings of time and consciousness. The ways in which these qualities are musically constructed are furthermore so intimately involved with other quintessential Schubertian compositional traits such as lyricism, harmonic deftness and idiosyncratic formal structures, that memory might well appear to be a guiding thread to understanding Schubert's music.

But memory, as we have seen, is not a necessary metaphor. It may fit Schubert's music, but other, related ideas such as landscapes, dreamscapes, imaginary spaces, psychological processes and those of subjective consciousness may have just as good an affordance. The popularity of memory metaphors in musicological accounts of Schubert's music, especially in the last two decades, might thus be the reflection of the greater recent propensity for memory discourse, a postmodern *malaise de mémoire*. Yet memory was an important notion for Schubert and his contemporaries, and, as Gibbs says, nostalgia has been associated with Schubert since his own day. One need think only of *Winterreise* to be convinced of the importance of memory for

[115] Burnham, 'The "Heavenly Length" of Schubert's Music'.

[116] Burnham, 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth', 36. Recent interest in the relationship between music, landscape and subjectivity is prodigious; a good starting point may be found in Daniel Grimley, *Grieg: Music, Landscape and Norwegian Identity* (Woodbridge, 2006), and the colloquy on ecomusicology contained in *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 64 (2011), 391–424.

Romantic consciousness. Not long after Schubert's untimely death, his first important critic, Robert Schumann, set the terms for the reception of Schubert's music by turning to this same theme of memory. Moreover, as is so often noted, music's own temporal qualities obviously make it the ideal bearer of such attributes. Modern audiences might be more susceptible to memorial language, but this quality has been intimately bound up with Schubert all along.

Memory thus provides a powerful conceptual metaphor for understanding Schubert's music, creating a richer meaning for it. To ask whether the memory metaphor is right or wrong is to ask the wrong question. His music affords the comparison, often well, sometimes more dubiously, but this analogy has been seen as significant for many people and thereby contributes towards constructing the music's meaning. And, as a temporal art, irreducible to linguistic determination, there is always the possibility that music is telling us something about memory and consciousness that other lines of scientific and philosophical inquiry are unable to disclose. As Burnham fittingly remarks:

> Schubert's achievement can now be mustered alongside some of Western modernity's other grand statements about memory, such as those of Proust or Bergson. At the very least, we seem finally ready to work from the assumption that this is not just innocently beautiful music spun out at heavenly length, but music that has as much to say about the human condition as the music of Beethoven or anyone else.[117]

Memory is one of the bedrocks of the human psyche and of modern subjectivity. It is arguable that this is one of the main reasons why Schubert's music fascinates so many listeners, why it inspires such feelings of affection and kinship, why we choose to wander to the tunes he makes. For in his music we recognize nothing other than ourselves.

ABSTRACT

As well over a century of reception history attests, qualities of memory, reminiscence and nostalgia seem to constitute some of the most characteristic attributes of Schubert's music. Yet despite the undoubted allure of this subject and its popularity in recent years, the means by which music may suggest the actions of memory and temporal consciousness are often unclear or under-theorized in scholarship. This article examines how such nostalgic subjectivities are constructed in Schubert's music and the language used to describe it. Rather than overturning the now habitual associations between Schubert and memory, the article seeks to question more deeply how they are, and indeed might better be, supported. It looks principally at the String Quartet in A minor, D.804 ('Rosamunde'), and draws further on such staples of the Schubertian memory discourse as the Quartet in G, D.887, and the Piano Sonata in B♭, D.960.

[117] Burnham, 'Schubert and the Sound of Memory', 657.